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Renewing the Budget: Recommendations for
Louisiana’s Renewable Energy Tax Credit
INTRODUCTION
In 2007, Louisiana legislators enacted the Wind and Solar
Energy Systems Tax Credit (WSES), a Louisiana tax credit that
encourages increased investment and usage of renewable energy
technologies, including both solar and wind power.1 Over the past
five years, actual costs of the tax credit have exceeded budget
projections by more than 18 times.2 The 2012 Louisiana Tax
Exemption Budget states that the purpose of the wind and solar tax
exemption will be achieved if operated “in a fiscally effective
manner.”3 Critics say that the inflated costs of the tax credit are in
no way fiscally effective.4 On the other hand, proponents believe
that higher costs from the tax credit represent more consumers
taking advantage of the subsidy, which creates a positive effect on
Louisiana’s economy.5
The underlying purpose of Louisiana’s renewable energy tax
policy needs to be reexamined. Due to vague drafting of the tax
credit and a misguided approach, the WSES is wreaking havoc on
the Louisiana state budget. A novel assessment of the policy’s goals
is necessary to properly recommend a course of action to the
Louisiana Legislature in their future attempt to amend the tax
credit.6 This includes examining sources of energy on which to use
tax policy, the negative effects of tax policy in general, and how to
manage externalities from non-renewable energy sources. When tax
policy extends into the energy sector, many considerations arise.
Such considerations include the length of time that the subsidy

Copyright 2013, by JOE ELLISON.
1. Act No. 371, 2007 La. Acts 2076, 2077 (codified at LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 47:6030 (2009)).
2. Melinda Deslatte, La. Solar Tax Credit Price Tag Far Above Estimates,
BUS. WK. (Aug. 9, 2012), http://www.businessweek.com/ap/2012-08-09/la-dotsolar-tax-credit-price-tag-far-above-estimates.
3. LA. DEP’T OF REVENUE, TAX EXEMPTION BUDGET 2011−2012, at 123
(2011–2012), http://www.revenue.louisiana.gov/forms/publications/TEB%282011
%29.pdf.
4. See Michelle Millhollon, Official: Solar Energy Tax Credit Needs Limits,
THE ADVOCATE (Oct. 23, 2012), http://theadvocate.com/news/4213973-123
/official-solar-energy-tax-credit.
5. See id.
6. Maria Koklanaris, Louisiana Lawmakers Approve Phaseout of Solar
Panel Tax Credit, 2013 STT 108−18. The Louisiana State Senate approved
legislation to sunset the WSES by January 1, 2017.
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should remain in effect, how to encourage energy producers to be
self-sufficient, and how to manage demand of energy.
To recommend a fresh course of action to the Louisiana
Legislature, this Comment will first discuss the pitfalls of
subsidizing renewable energy sources and will analyze many
alternatives to tax policy that encourage the use of renewable energy
sources. These alternatives include renewable portfolio standards,
feed-in tariffs, and research grants and loans as tools to incentivize
renewable energy use. Additionally, cap-and-trade programs and
carbon taxes indirectly incentivize renewable energies by imposing
restrictions and costs on non-renewable activities. Each of these
alternatives is currently utilized internationally or within the United
States. Some alternatives are even present in Louisiana.
Part I of this Comment will explain the current goals of
legislators who shape federal renewable energy policy. Part II
explains the reasons for using tax policies to promote renewable
energy use and explores the negative consequences of using tax
policy to achieve these goals. Part II also considers the petroleum
industry as a tax policy case study to draw important lessons for
how renewable energy tax policy should be structured. Part III
examines alternatives to using tax subsidies to encourage the use of
renewable energy sources. Part IV introduces the issues with
Louisiana’s wind and solar energy systems tax credit and analyzes
the effectiveness of wind and solar energy compared to other energy
sources. Finally, Part V presents an alternative federal policy to
encourage renewable energy production, considers proposed
amendments to the Louisiana tax credit, and recommends a new
course of action for Louisiana’s renewable energy system tax credit.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Importance of Renewable Energy
Renewable energy sources have been a recent topic of debate
since the goal of United States energy independence is gaining
prominence.7 One current debate centers on whether the United
States should attain energy independence through supporting
increased oil and gas drilling and providing tax cuts for domestic oil
production8 or through minimizing the country’s oil dependence by
7. Javier E. David, US Energy Production Growing by Leaps and Bounds:
BP, CNBC (June 14, 2013, 11:21 AM), http://www.cnbc.com/id/100816544.
8. See The American Energy Initiative : A Focus on the Outlook for Achieving
North American Energy Independence Within the Decade: Hearing Before the
Energy & Power Subcomm. of the Energy & Commerce Comm., 112th Cong. 2
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expanding support for clean energy sources (wind, solar, biomass,
hydropower, clean coal, natural gas, and nuclear power).9
Climate change is another global concern that is driving the
development of renewable energy sources.10 The opinion of a large
scientific community is that greenhouse gases affect the world’s
climate, disrupt agriculture and nations’ economies, and cause
migration effects.11 Experts advocate a transformation of energy
production, consumption habits, and transportation methods in order
to combat the consequences of climate change.12
Regardless of which policy is followed, the United States has
long maintained a large stake in the advancement of alternative
energy sources. In a 1990 report, the General Accounting Office
stated that “developing alternative fuels, increasing fuel efficiency in
transportation, and continuing development of the Strategic
Petroleum Reserve” would be more beneficial than additional oil
and gas subsidies towards the goal of increasing energy security.13
The United States Department of Energy’s mission for renewable
energy today is to “[c]atalyze the timely, material, and efficient
transformation of the nation’s energy system and secure U.S.
leadership in clean energy technologies.”14
In order to encourage the development of alternative energy
technology,15 Congress has instituted many federal tax credits.16
Most states also offer tax incentives and other policies to encourage

(2012), http://energycommerce.house.gov/sites/republicans.energy-commerce.house
.gov/files/Hearings/EP/20120913/HHRG-112-IF03-WState-Weiss D-20120913.pdf
(statement of Daniel J. Weiss, Senior Fellow, Ctr. For Am. Progress Action Fund).
9. See THE WHITE HOUSE, BLUEPRINT FOR A SECURE ENERGY FUTURE (2011),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/blueprint_secure_energy_future.pdf.
10. See Angela Merkel, Foreword to GLOBAL SUSTAINABILITY, at ix (Hans
Joachim Schellnhuber et al, eds., 2010) (“Climate change threatens both our
security and economic development.”).
11. ERIC A. POSNER & DAVID WEISBACH, CLIMATE CHANGE JUSTICE 1
(2010).
12. Merkel, supra note 10, at ix.
13. U. S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/GGD-90-75, TAX POLICY:
ADDITIONAL PETROLEUM PRODUCTION TAX INCENTIVES ARE OF QUESTIONABLE
MERIT 4 (1990), http://www.gao.gov/assets/150/149358.pdf.
14. Mission, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, http://energy.gov/mission (last visited
Oct. 1, 2013).
15. See generally Mona Hymel, The United States’ Experience with EnergyBased Tax Incentives: The Evidence Supporting Tax Incentives for Renewable
Energy, 38 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 43 (2006).
16. See id. at 64–78 (providing examples of federal tax credits).
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the development of renewable energy sources that work in
conjunction with the federal credits.17
II. ECONOMIC BASIS FOR TAX CREDITS AND HISTORICAL EXAMPLES
IN THE ENERGY SECTOR
A. The Case for Tax Policy
In order to properly analyze the effectiveness of Louisiana’s tax
credits, it is important to understand how and why legislators use tax
policy to encourage certain activities. Tax theory aims to discover
how to most efficiently allocate resources without the negative
effects that taxes can cause. One such negative effect is market
distortion.18 Market efficiency can be measured by a number of
methods. Tax theorists assume that a perfectly efficient market
generates an ideal allocation of resources.19 This ideal allocation of
resources is referred to as the Pareto efficiency.20 A Pareto efficient
market is one where no single participant can increase his own
benefits without producing negative effects for another party.21 The
Kaldor-Hicks standard is another method of measuring efficiency,
but it adopts a macro-economic view rather than the microeconomic view of the Pareto method. According to the KaldorHicks method, efficiency is achieved when the market participant’s
change in activity benefits society at large, even though some may
be negatively affected.22 However, these measures of efficiency
sometimes fall short. Perfectly efficient markets rarely exist because
of externalities. Externalities are positive or negative side effects
that result from market activity and distort the true costs or benefits
derived from the activity.23
In the energy industry, the most prevalent examples of
externalities are pollutants. Without market regulation, non-clean
energy companies only pay for their own activities (the labor,
materials, and indirect costs) while the community bears the social

17. See Database of State Incentives for Renewables & Efficiency, U. S.
DEP’T OF ENERGY, http://www.dsireusa.org/ (last visited Oct. 1, 2013).
18. See Eric M. Zolt, The Uneasy Case for Uniform Taxation, 16 VA. TAX
REV. 39, 69 (1996).
19. Id.
20. Id. at 61.
21. Id.
22. See Nicholas Kaldor, Welfare Propositions of Economics and
Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility, 49 ECON. J. 549 (1939).
23. Zolt, supra note 18, at 69.
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and environmental costs of the resulting pollution.24 Thus, the
market is inefficient because the energy producers are not paying the
socially efficient price.25 For this reason, governments tend to step
in and implement either regulation or tax policy. English economist,
Arthur Pigou, was the first to suggest the theory of using tax policy
to manage externalities.26 The Coase theorem suggests an alternative
to tax policy with a private market solution to the problem of
negative externalities.27 The Coase theorem accepts that market
failures exist, so Coase suggests that if a party causes a negative
externality on another party who is aware of the cost, without
transaction costs, the parties could come to an efficient solution.28
Tax policy in the energy sector consists of either taxes or
subsidies to accomplish social, economic, environmental, or
financial goals by influencing the market.29 Taxes are used to
discourage a certain activity through monetary means; however,
subsidies, such as tax credits, are incentives.30 In the energy sector,
tax credits are mainly used to encourage the growth of technology
development.31 The key to finding the most effective use of tax
credits is to support subsidies in industries where the initial capital
outlay presents the largest barrier of entry into the market.32
B. The Negative Effects of Using Tax Policy
While taxes can be useful to disincentivize less desirable
activities, the most efficient tax is one that causes the lowest amount
of market distortions.33 There are three effects that distortions cause:
(1) the income effect, (2) the substitution effect, and (3) the financial
effect.34
The income effect, which is created by the imposition of taxes,
is measured by the changes in consumer behavior to make up for

24. See DAVID HUNTER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND
POLICY 105–07 (Thomson Reuters/Foundation Press, 4th ed. 2011).
25. Id. at 69–70.
26. See A.C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 192–93 (4th ed. 1960).
27. See R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
28. See id.
29. SALVATORE LAZZARI, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33578, ENERGY TAX
POLICY: HISTORY AND CURRENT ISSUES 1 (2008), http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs
/misc/RL33578.pdf.
30. Id.
31. See generally id.
32. Hymel, supra note 15, at 45.
33. Zolt, supra note 18, at 63.
34. Id.
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lost purchasing power.35 An example of an income effect is a
consumer working extra hours to supplement income spent to pay
for energy cost increases.
The substitution effect occurs when consumers choose lowertaxed activities or goods instead of similar, higher-taxed activities or
goods.36 For example, if one could hypothetically purchase natural
gas and petroleum energy at the same price and a tax on petroleum
was imposed, a rational consumer would purchase natural gas over
petroleum.
Finally, the financial effect occurs when individuals or
corporations change their procedures in order to manipulate the tax
treatment of their activities.37 Energy companies hiring tax
consultants to provide the most favorable tax treatment is a financial
effect.
Policy-makers aim to minimize market distortion in order to
lessen these effects of tax policy that result in a deadweight loss in
the market.38 A deadweight loss is the difference between the free
market level of supply and demand and the inefficiencies caused by
the income effect, substitution effect, and the financial effect. The
amount of deadweight loss is influenced by the price elasticity of the
activity being taxed.39 Price elasticity is the sensitivity of demand to
changes in price;40 greater price elasticity leads to more sensitivity
to demand. If a good is more sensitive to demand, the tax policy will
cause more distortion due to the influences on consumer behavior.41
Demand is elastic if the price elasticity index is greater than ±1.42
35. Id. The income effect is most commonly observed through two scenarios:
(1) when taxes are imposed on a good, which is passed on to the consumer, and
(2) when taxes are imposed on the consumer. In the first scenario, a person with
unchanged income has less purchasing power to acquire the good. In the second
scenario, however, the consumer has less purchasing power when the prices
remain constant.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. Since the goal is finding a tax that minimizes distortions in consumer
behavior, a lump sum tax is often discussed. A lump sum tax is fixed and cannot
be changed based on consumer behavior. However, lump-sum taxes are often
rejected because of problems with equity. Persons with lower income take on the
same burden as those with higher income. Id. at 64.
39. Id.
40. JOHN C.B. COOPER, ORG. OF THE PETROLEUM EXPORTING COS., PRICE
ELASTICITY OF DEMAND FOR CRUDE OIL: ESTIMATES FOR 23 COUNTRIES 3 (2003),
http://15961.pbworks.com/f/Cooper.2003.OPECReview.PriceElasticityofDemandf
orCrudeOil.pdf.
41. Zolt, supra note 18, at 63.
42. Economics Basics: Elasticity, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia
.com/university/economics/economics4.asp#axzz2BOllExaX (last visited Oct. 1,
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Likewise, demand is inelastic if the index of the good is less than
±1.43 For example, the price elasticity index for crude oil in the
United States is –0.061.44 This means that crude oil is a very
inelastic energy source,45 and deadweight loss would be minimal if
tax policies manipulate oil prices. The price elasticity index acts as a
multiplier to the market distortions and worsens the situation as the
elasticity of the product increases. In other words, consumers will
generally continue to buy petroleum products at the same level if a
tax is imposed on the product. In comparison, one limited study
placed the price elasticity for renewable energy sources at
approximately +2.7, which means tax legislators would be more
hesitant to subsidize the renewable energy sector.46
B. Use of Tax Subsidies in the Oil Industry
Historical examples of tax policy in the energy industry are
important because they illustrate potential problems with future
policies. Such problems include when to end tax subsidies,47
whether to extend the duration of tax subsidies until the industry
achieves financial independence, and whether the burdens on both
federal and state income are ultimately worth it. It is therefore
appropriate to examine the oil industry’s rise to the United States’
primary energy source and the role that tax policy played in that rise.
There were three primary reasons for the tax subsidies provided to
the oil industry: (1) to encourage petrochemical exploration for
reserves during the initial research and development stages of oil

2013). The more that the elasticity indexes exceeds ±1, the more elastic the item is.
Items with high elasticity are often luxuries or have substitutes. Id.
43. Id.
44. COOPER, supra note 40, at 4.
45. Oil is very inelastic because it is a necessary commodity. The number of
substitutes is very limited. The long-run price elasticity of crude oil increases to 0.453. The long-run index uses demand numbers that assume more substitutes will
become available over time.
46. Erik Johnson, The Price Elasticity of Supply of Renewable Electricity
Generation: Evidence from State Renewable Portfolio Standards 2 (Ga. Inst. of
Tech., Working Paper No. WP2011-001, 2011), https://smartech.gatech.edu
/bitstream/handle/1853/44246/WP2011-001EJohnson.pdf?sequence=1.
47. Nick Juliano, Tax Policy: Building a Bridge to Zero -- Questions Swirl
Around Design of Wind Incentive Phaseout, E&E PUBLISHING, LLC (June 12,
2012), http://www.eenews.net/public/EEDaily/2012/06/12/2 (“Determining a
definite endpoint for the [production tax credit] is difficult because a number of
variables are at play -- primarily the price of [competing sources], as well as the
pace of advancements in . . . technology, the cost of credit for . . . developers and
the broader, economywide demand for energy.”).
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production, (2) to mitigate dangers that arise during the production
cycle, and (3) to bridge the gap between the activity costs in the
private and public sectors.48
The oil industry began when petroleum was discovered to be the
optimal alternative to coal.49 Incentives to boost the amount of
reserves and production levels began in 1916 with the expensing50
of intangible drilling costs51 (IDCs).52 Deductible IDCs included
labor costs, material costs, overhead, and repairs as expense writeoffs.53 In 1926, Congress implemented the percentage depletion
allowance, which allows taxpayers to recuperate a percentage of the
costs of mineral investment.54 Under the percentage depletion
allowance, the extraction of oil deposits from a landowner’s
property is recognized as an expense. The purchase price of the land,
exploration costs, and investments are recognized as capital costs,
which means that the corresponding costs can be deducted in future
tax years.55 The annual allowed recovery for extraction is based on a
fixed percentage of nationwide production, so the recoverable
amount can exceed actual investment by the taxpayer.56
In the 1970s, the United States began to deplete its proven oil
reserves while consumer demand continued to increase.57 In
response, Congress passed two major pieces of legislation to
encourage development of unproven oil resources.58 First, the Crude
Oil Windfall Profit Act of 1980 provided a $3.00 tax credit per
barrel of oil produced in the United States.59 Second, the Energy
Policy Act of 2005 provided many incentives for the oil and gas
industry, as well as the renewable energy industry. The 2005 act
48. Hymel, supra note 15, at 47.
49. Id.
50. For accounting treatment, expensing is the deduction of expenses in the
current year rather than capitalizing, which allows deductions over the useful life
of an asset.
51. Intangible drilling costs are expenditures that have no salvage value.
52. LAZZARI, supra note 29, at 2.
53. T.D. 2447, 19 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 31 (1917). Expensing refers to the
ability to deduct losses from profits in order to lower the amount of taxable
income. This way, oil producers could fully deduct the costs of bringing a well
into production from income.
54. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PETROLEUM AND ETHANOL FUELS:
TAX INCENTIVES AND RELATED GAO WORK 5 (2000), http://www.gao.gov/new
.items/rc00301r.pdf.
55. See Hymel, supra note 15, at 48.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 47, 49.
58. See id. at 50–54. Unproven sources include shale oil, tar sand oil,
biomass, liquid and gaseous coal.
59. Crude Oil Windfall Profits Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-223, 94 Stat. 229
(1980) (current version at 26 U.S.C. 45K (2006)).
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broadens provisions that allow more taxpayers to qualify for the
percentage depletion allowance and increases the maximum amount
of barrels that can utilize the allowance.60 The effect of the 2005 Act
is a tax cut of $18.8 billion across the energy industry.61 According to
a 2005 Congressional Budget Office report, the petroleum and natural
gas industry have the lowest capital effective tax rate (9.2%) among
corporations.62 Given the United States’ continued dependence on
petroleum,63 the severely low effective tax rates on the oil industry,
and the recent failed attempts of incentivizing further oil production,64
a change in petroleum industry tax policy is necessary.
III. COMPARISON OF LOUISIANA’S TAX CREDITS TO OTHER
APPROACHES
There are several alternatives to Louisiana’s renewable energy
tax credit that would encourage renewable energy use and
development of renewable energy technology. These alternatives
involve regulatory intervention or adaptations of tax policy. Some
policies incentivize the desired activity, while others only manage
externalities by imposing restrictions on less desirable activities.
A. Incentives for Renewable Energy Markets
1. Renewable Portfolio Standards
Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPS) are state-level policies
that require utility companies to allocate a set rate of renewable60. Joint Committee on Taxation, Description and Technical Explanation of
the Conference Agreement of H.R. 6, Title XIII, the “Energy Tax Incentives Act of
2005” (JCX-60-05), July 28, 2005, http://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func
=startdown&id=1555.
61. LAZZARI, supra note 29, at 11.
62. PAUL BURNHAM & LARRY OZANNE, CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE,
TAXING CAPITAL INCOME: EFFECTIVE RATES AND APPROACHES TO REFORM 11
(2005), http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/67xx/doc6792/1018-tax.pdf.
63. See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., DOE/EIA-0383(2012), ANNUAL ENERGY
OUTLOOK 2012 WITH PROJECTIONS TO 2035, at 131 (2012), http://www.eia.gov
/forecases/aeo/pdf/0383(2012).pdf (noting that projected U.S. consumption of oil
and other petroleum sources through 2035 have a projected growth rate of 0.0%).
64. See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., SR/OIAF/2004-01, ANALYSIS OF FIVE
SELECTED TAX PROVISIONS OF THE CONFERENCE ENERGY BILL OF 2003, at 2
(2004), http://www.eia.gov/analysis/requests/archive/2004/ceb/pdf/sroiaf%282004
%2901.pdf (“With the exception of Section 29, the provisions considered in this
report do not measurably increase domestic oil or gas production over the next 10
years or over the forecast through 2025.”).
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sourced electricity to consumers.65 The purpose of RPS policy is to
increase the market demand of renewable energy sources.66 The hope
behind this purpose is that renewable energy sources will become
competitive alternatives due to cost reductions from economies of
scale.67 Utility companies can comply with RPS mandates in three
ways: (1) acquiring a renewable energy generation unit, (2)
purchasing bundled renewable electricity from a renewable facility, or
(3) purchasing renewable energy certificates.68 A renewable energy
credit is a tradable commodity that represents one megawatt hour
(MWh) of electricity produced from a renewable generator.69
Renewable energy producers may redeem certificates issued by the
state’s RPS and sell these certificates to utility companies who are
mandated to meet RPS standards. The certificates represent
compliance with state mandates and theoretically shift the
environmental damage payments to the energy producers.
Renewable certificate transactions between renewable energy
producers and the utility companies illustrate application of the
Coase theorem.70 According to the theorem, if the cost to
compensate the harmed party is less than the costs required to
prevent the harm, the party causing the harm would rather reach a
bargain with the affected parties than pay the price of prevention.71
The compensatory payments become factored into the activity’s cost
of production when the “winner” pays the harmed party.72 In
applying this illustration to RPS, the system assumes that it is more
cost effective for the utilities to purchase certificates than to prevent
the harm by completely eliminating non-clean energy sources or
creating renewable sources.
Louisiana is currently exploring the implementation of RPS.73 In
2010, the Louisiana Public Service Commission (LPSC) approved a
65. Renewable Portfolio Standards, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
http://www.epa.gov/agstar/tools/funding/renewable.html (last updated Sept. 27,
2012).
66. Id.
67. OLE LANGNISS & RYAN WISER, ERNEST ORLANDO LAWRENCE BERKELEY
NATIONAL LABORATORY, THE RENEWABLES PORTFOLIO STANDARD IN TEXAS 14
(2001), http://eande.lbl.gov/sites/all/files/publications/report-lbnl-49107.pdf; see
also Alan McDonald & Leo Schrattenholzer, Learning Rates for Energy
Technologies, 29 ENERGY POL’Y 255, 255 (2001) (noting that economies of scale
occur when unit costs decrease with increased experience and expertise).
68. Renewable Portfolio Standards, supra note 65.
69. Id.
70. See Coase, supra note 27.
71. See generally id.
72. Id. at 11.
73. See Re-study of a Renewable Portfolio Standard for the State of
Louisiana, Docket No. R-28271 Subdocket B (La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n August 21,
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RPS pilot program.74 The program remains in the experimental
stage of implementation to verify that utility costs do not
significantly increase from companies passing on the costs to
customers.75 The pilot program contains two major components: the
research component and the Request for Proposal (RFP)
component.76 The research component requires investor-owned
utility companies to develop at least three projects that provide data
about renewable energy resources.77 Companies either may
construct their own renewable energy generators or must create a
pricing arrangement with renewable energy producers to purchase
energy; these projects must be in full operation by the end of 2013.78
The RFP component applies to all utilities in Louisiana and requires
each company to submit proposals for development of long-term
(ten to twenty years) renewable energy resources.79 However, the
Re-Study docket does not specify location requirements for either
the research or the RFP projects.80 Therefore, the utilities could
potentially farm their renewable production outside of Louisiana
while the non-renewable activity continues at the same level within
the state.
2. Feed-in Tariffs
Feed-in tariffs are fast growing market incentives that were first
implemented in Europe twenty years ago.81 Feed-in tariffs mandate
that utility companies enter into long-term (10–20 year) supply
contracts with renewable energy producers at fixed rates.82 The rates
are often set at the renewable energy producer’s cost of production
or, in some cases, a premium is added to the market price of
electricity.83 Generally, the rates are differentiated between types of

2013), available at http://lpscstar.louisiana.gov/star/ViewFile.aspx?Id=e81d68d00101-4c38-8b8a-8e2f0814d321.
74. Re-study of a Renewable Portfolio Standard for the State of Louisiana,
Docket No. R-28271 Subdocket B (La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n June 23, 2010),
available at http://lpscstar.louisiana.gov/star/ViewFile.aspx?Id=d1389c71-c14f46e1-8fa9-4d429cc0431b.
75. Id. at 4.
76. Id. at 3–5.
77. Id. at 4.
78. Id. at 5.
79. Id.
80. See id.
81. Wilson H. Rickerson, et. al., If the Shoe FITs: Using Feed-in Tariffs to
Meet U.S. Renewable Electricity Targets, 20 ELECTRICITY J. 73, 73 (2007).
82. Id.
83. Id.
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renewable energy to allow the producer to recover the initial
investment of production and to possibly increase capacity.84 In
addition to incentivizing the production of renewable energy, a
major benefit of feed-in tariffs is the reduced strain on the power
grid.85
In Europe, the predecessor to feed-in tariffs began in 1991 with
the Stromeinspeisungsgesetz (Electricity Feed Act), which
established the price for German utilities purchasing renewable
energy at 90% of the market electricity rate.86 This market-guided
approach ultimately failed when German energy prices decreased
below a profitable level for renewable producers. Germany
subsequently enacted the Erneuerbare-Energien-Gesetz (EEG or
Renewable Energy Act), which fixed prices by an independent
index.87 The EEG provided fixed price contracts for twenty years,
with rates decreasing per year to adjust for economies of scale.88
The initiative has, to date, been rather successful, as Germany has
increased its renewable energy production from 6.3% of national
energy consumption in 200089 to 20.8% in 2011.90 With the support
provided by EEG incentives for renewable generators, Germany has
developed the greatest capacity of solar energy production in the
world.91 Denmark and Spain followed Germany’s example by
introducing similar incentives through feed-in tariffs. These three
nations now supply 53% of the world’s wind production.92
In 2001, a debate between proponents of feed-in tariffs and
proponents of renewable portfolio standards occurred in the
European Union when the European Parliament Directive
recommended renewable energy goals for each member nation but
did not specify how the goals should be attained.93 Poland, the
United Kingdom, Sweden, Italy, and Romania chose renewable
portfolio standards; the remaining countries in the European Union
84. Carolyn Fischer & Louis Preonas, Combining Policies for Renewable
Energy: Is the Whole Less than the Sum of its Parts? 5 (Res. for the Future,
Discussion Paper No. 10-19, 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3
/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1569634.
85. See Ricardo Rüther & Roberto Zilles, Making the Case for GridConnected Photovoltaics in Brazil, 39 ENERGY POL’Y 1027 (2011).
86. Rickerson, supra note 81, at 74.
87. Rickerson, supra note 81, at 74.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 75.
90. Crossing the 20 Percent Mark: Green Energy Use Jumps in Germany,
SPIEGEL ONLINE (Aug. 30, 2011, 1:04 PM), http://www.spiegel.de/international
/crossing-the-20-percent-mark-green-energy-use-jumps-in-germany-a-783314.html.
91. Rickerson, supra note 81, at 74.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 75.
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decided to implement feed-in tariffs.94 The main difference between
feed-in tariffs and renewable portfolio standards is that renewable
portfolio standards use quantity-based regulation in the energy
market while feed-in tariffs are a price-based regulation.95 In other
words, quantity-based policies control the amount of energy
production allowed in the market. Alternatively, rice-based
mechanisms focus solely on manipulating the price of an energy
source. In order to study the effectiveness of these two energy
strategies, the European Commission created a report in 2005.96
Most countries aiming to improve renewable energy portfolio
performance adopted a feed-in tariff system:97 the fact that most
countries moved to feed-in tariffs indicates that feed-in tariffs are
more effective at encouraging renewable energy production than
renewable portfolio standards in the wind and biomass industries.
Additionally, the study found that price stability from the long-term
contracts led to increased consumer confidence compared to the
portfolio standards that were not as insulated from price risks.98
While renewable portfolio standards and feed-in tariffs are
viewed as separate policies in Europe, several states in the U.S.
weave the two policies into one comprehensive program.99 Major
elements of feed-in tariffs are included in the previously mentioned
Louisiana Public Service Commission general order to re-evaluate
renewable portfolio standards.100 Also, tariff options are available in
the research component of the Louisiana pilot program for
renewable energies.101 The tariff pricing agreements have pricing
terms of three years and should be fully operational by the end of
2013.102 The pricing structure is the value of the utility’s avoided
cost of purchasing renewable energy rather than producing it, plus a
94. Id.
95. Mary Jean Bürer & Rolf Wüstenhagen, Which Renewable Energy Policy
is a Venture Capitalist’s Best Friend? Empirical Evidence from a Survey of
International Cleantech Investors, 37 ENERGY POL’Y 4997, 4999 (2009).
96. The Support of Electricity from Renewable Energy Sources (Comm’n of
the Eur. Cmtys., Working Paper No., 2008), available at http://ec.europa.eu
/energy/climate_actions/doc/2008_res_working_document_en.pdf.
97. Id. at 6−7. The fact that most countries moved to feed-in tariffs indicates
that feed-in tariffs are more effective at encouraging renewable energy production
than renewable portfolio standards in the wind and biomass industries.
98. Rickerson, supra note 81, at 76.
99. Id. at 74.
100. Re-study of a Renewable Portfolio Standard for the State of Louisiana,
Docket No. R-28271 Subdocket B (La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n June 23, 2010),
available at http://lpscstar.louisiana.gov/star/ViewFile.aspx?Id=d1389c71-c14f46e1-8fa9-4d429cc0431b.
101. The option requires the utilities to develop a tariff and contracts to
purchase renewable energy from a new renewable energy source. Id. at 3–4.
102. Id. at 4.
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$30 per MWh premium.103 As mentioned above, the main benefit of
feed-in tariff policy is long-term price stability and consumer
confidence; the benefits are negated when the policy provides for
short-term contracts instead.104 The Louisiana renewable energy
pilot program may not produce accurate results, however, because
new producers of renewable energy will be less inclined to enter the
market without a long-term financing commitment.
3. Research and Development Support
Research grants, loans, and subsidies are incentives for
renewable energy production provided at the federal or state level.
In Europe, these incentives have mostly been replaced by feed-in
tariff and renewable portfolio standards.105 Under the American
Reinvestment and Recovery Act of 2009,106 renewable energy
ventures are eligible for a 30% cash grant in lieu of the federal
investment tax credit107 or production tax credit.108 Also available
for renewable energy producers is the Section 1603 grant
program.109 The program is more valuable than the investment tax
credit when taxpayers do not have sufficient tax liability110 and “has
been heavily used by the wind and geothermal energy sectors: as of
March 1, 2010, 64% of all 2009 large wind power capacity . . . had
elected . . . the grant rather than the PTC (production tax credit).”111
103. Id.
104. Rickerson, supra note 81, at 73.
105. Fischer & Preonas, supra note 84, at 5.
106. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5,
123 Stat. 115 (current version at 26 U.S.C. § 48 (2006 & Supp. 2012)).
107. This provides a tax credit from the production and sale of renewable
energy to an unrelated party, which amounts to 2.2 cents per kWh for wind,
closed-loop biomass, and geothermal production and 1.1 cents for other renewable
energy sources. KPMG INTERNATIONAL, TAXES AND INCENTIVES FOR
RENEWABLE ENERGY 45 (2012), available at http://www.kpmg.com/Global/en
/IssuesAndInsights/ArticlesPublications/Documents/taxes-incentives-renewableenergy-2012.pdf.
108. The production tax credit is a tax credit for energy property that is put into
service during the tax year. The credit amount is 30% of fuel cell, solar, and small
wind property costs, with 10% for combined heat and power, micro-turbine
property and geothermal heat pumps. Id.; Roberta F. Mann, Back to the Future:
Recommendations and Predictions for Greener Tax Policy, 88 OR. L. REV. 355,
386 (2010).
109. Mark Bolinger, et al., Preliminary Evaluation of the Section 1603
Treasury Grant Program for Renewable Power Projects in the United States, 38
ENERGY POL’Y 6804, 6814 (2010).
110. Id.
111. Id. at 6807 (The benefit of the grant is that “cash is highly fungible and
very easy to use.”).
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There are a couple criticisms of research grants. These criticisms
include free riding and utility companies that focus on targeting
investment rather than results of the research.112 A grant-targeting
investment (rather than results-targeting) is the main disadvantage of
grants when compared to production tax credits. While a welldesigned production tax credit will offer a higher tax credit for more
effective research, a research grant provides fixed amounts.
Although research grants do not discourage researchers from
striving for more effective results, they also do not directly
encourage this effort like production tax credits do.113 The benefits
derived from research grants could also flow to foreign nations
through free riding. In this free riding problem, a state or federal
grant program would pay researchers to invest in renewable energy
technology and foreign research communities could benefit from the
domestic investment without bearing the research costs.114
B. Disincentives for Non-Renewable Sources
1. Cap-and-Trade
Cap-and-trade is the practice of creating maximum emissions
levels in an industry with undesirable impacts, issuing allowances
within the industry, and providing a trade market for the allowances
to be transferred.115 In essence, the government creates a system
where industries must pay to pollute.116 Experts argue that cap-andtrade programs are better environmental policies than taxes for two
reasons. First, the maximum emissions level creates a cap on the
amount of pollution while taxes can only reduce pollution by using
price controls to discourage emissions.117 Second, cap-and-trade
mechanisms are more effective at distributing the non-compliance
consequences because a government chooses how to distribute the
permits that non-renewable producers must buy.118 The cap-andtrade method is another example of managing the problem
introduced by the Coase theorem. The costs of preventing carbon
emissions are greater than the costs of compensating the harmed
parties that arise out of cap-and-trade programs.119 Thus, the carbon
112. Id. at 6815–17.
113. Id. at 6815.
114. See HUNTER, supra note 24, at 107.
115. See Fischer & Preonas, supra note 84, at 4.
116. POSNER & WEISBACH, supra note 11, at 42.
117. Id. at 42.
118. Id. at 48–49. For example, the government could issue the allowances to
citizens of cities where pollution most impacts their health.
119. See generally Coase, supra note 27.
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emissions are negative externalities on the market that distort the
efficient level of non-clean energy production. The purpose of the
cap allowances is to impose the cost of societal damage from the
carbon emissions onto the producers of those emissions so the
parties will negotiate an efficient solution.
The U.S. Acid Rain Program120 is a prominent example of a capand-trade program in the United States that creates a ceiling on the
amount of sulfur dioxide that energy plants can emit.121 At the state
level, the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative is a mandatory joint
program among nine East Coast states that plan to reduce carbon
dioxide emissions.122 The initiative states auction off the allowances
to utility companies and invest the proceeds into renewable energy
technologies.123
Another state cap-and-trade program is California’s AB-32,
Global Warming Solutions Act, which has a 2020 deadline for
achieving the greenhouse gas emissions cap.124 AB-32 has a
significant enforcement structure and serves as a model for a federal
cap-and-trade program. The enforcement structure includes
oversight of the certificate auction process to protect against price
manipulation.125 The California Air Resources Board will also host
a centralized tracking system of the carbon allowances.126 The
oversight of the auction process will be provided by an independent
monitoring organization.127
2. Carbon Tax
The goal of carbon taxes is to manage the externalities of carbon
emissions, which are mainly environmental effects, while providing a
low amount of administrative costs from collections and oversight.128
An effective carbon tax rate, according to Pigovian theory, is one
that is equal to the marginal public damages of producing an
120. See 42 U.S.C. § 7651(b) (2012).
121. See Fischer & Preonas, supra note 84, at 4.
122. REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE, http://www.rggi.org/rggi (last
visited Oct. 6, 2013).
123. CO2 Auctions, REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE, http://www.rggi
.org/market/co2_auctions (last visited Oct. 2, 2013).
124. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38561(a) (West 2013).
125. CAL. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, CAP AND TRADE: MARKET OVERSIGHT AND
ENFORCEMENT 1 (2011), http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/market_oversight
.pdf.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Gilbert E. Metcalf & David Weisbach, The Design of a Carbon Tax, 33
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 499, 503 (2009).
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additional unit of greenhouse gas.129 Because carbon emissions are
such a large externality of energy production, a Pigovian tax
supports free trade by correcting the production to the true price
where externalities are internalized.130 Finland was the first country
to introduce a carbon tax in 1990.131
Australia is in the process of implementing a $23 per ton carbon
tax on about 300 of Australia’s largest producers of carbon
emissions from the past year.132 An interesting aspect of the
Australian carbon tax, and one that will surely increase the chances
of its implementation, is the monetary benefits to consumers. Under
the direction of Australia’s Future Tax System Review, the
increased revenues of the carbon tax will increase the tax-free
threshold to exclude one million people from having to file an
income tax return in the 2013 tax year.133
A Canadian working study indicates that British Columbia’s
carbon tax was more effective in reducing demand for carbon
producing fuels than the impact associated with gasoline price
increases caused by the tax.134 Carbon taxes are effective because
they are easy to implement, compared to setting up trading systems
or more comprehensive policies.135 However, carbon tax policies
would be difficult to enforce in international transactions. In a recent
example, the U.S. Senate blocked European Union efforts to enforce
their emissions trading program standards on U.S. airlines.136

129. Id. at 511.
130. Id. at 540–43.
131. Ann Vourc’h & Miguel Jiminez, Enhancing Environmentally Sustainable
Growth in Finland 5 (Org. for Econ. Coop. & Dev., Working Paper No. 229,
2000), available at http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/download/5lgsjhvj82s6
.pdf?expires=1380756114&id=id&accname=guest&checksum=88AF2B4CC3B4
D411CC0AFC8404194AF3.
132. Australia’s Carbon Abatement Imports Target Revealed, The Sydney
Morning Herald (Nov. 1, 2012), http://www.smh.com.au/environment/climatechange/australias-carbon-abatement-imports-target-revealed-20121101-28l8f.html.
133. Modernising and Improving the Personal Tax System, A TAX PLAN FOR
OUR FUTURE (last visited Oct. 23, 2013), http://www.futuretax.gov.au
/content/Content.aspx?doc=FactSheets/personal_tax_system.htm..
134. See Nicholas Rivers & Brandon Schaufele, Carbon Tax Salience and
Gasoline Demand (Univ. of Ottawa Dep’t of Econ., Working Paper No. 1211E,
2012).
135. See Metcalf & Weisbach, supra note 130, at 502 n.11.
136. Valerie Volcovici, Senate Votes to Shield U.S. Airlines From EU’s
Carbon Scheme, REUTERS (Sept. 22, 2012, 4:27 PM), http://www.reuters.com
/article/2012/09/22/us-usa-carbon-airlines-idUSBRE88L06C20120922.
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IV. THE LOUISIANA APPROACH: THE WIND AND SOLAR ENERGY
SYSTEMS TAX CREDIT
A. Background
This section focuses on the impact of Louisiana’s largest
renewable energy tax credit: the Wind and Solar Energy Systems
Tax Credit (WSES).137 The WSES tax credit is a corporate or
individual income tax credit.138 The credit is provided to three
different categories of taxpayers who install wind or solar energy
systems: (1) a taxpayer who owns his residence, (2) a taxpayer who
owns a residential rental apartment project, or (3) any taxpayer,
regardless of property rights, who buys and installs a wind or solar
energy system at a Louisiana residence or residential rental
apartment project.139 The credit amount is 50% of the cost of each
wind or solar energy system, including installation costs.140 The
maximum amount of the credit per system is $12,500, which is
refundable and can be used in combination with federal tax
credits.141 When the WSES was enacted in 2007, the estimated
annual lost tax revenue was $500,000 per year.142 However,
estimates place the corporate and individual tax revenue lost over a
five-year period at $49 million,143 nearly twenty times higher than
expected.
B. The Result of Vague Drafting
The WSES tax credit is too vague to accomplish its goal and
remain fiscally responsible. Prior to 2009, only a “resident
individual at his residence” or “the owner of a residential rental
apartment project” could claim the tax credit for a solar or wind
energy system.144 The legislators added another possible category of
claimants defined as “a taxpayer who purchases and installs such a
system in a residence or a residential rental apartment project which
is located in Louisiana.”145 This newly added claimant category
departs from the original language that involved real property
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
(2008).
143.
144.
145.

LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47:6030 (2013).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
LA. DEP’T OF REVENUE, TAX EXEMPTION BUDGET 2007–2008, at 114
LA. DEP’T OF REVENUE, supra note 3, at 20, 33.
La. Act 467, 2009 La. Acts 2929.
Id.
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ownership; the purchaser (who is the installer) of the renewable
energy system does not need to have a property interest in the
residence. This language was added because some homeowners
wanted to install solar energy systems, but they could not afford the
initial investment—which was not subsidized by the state and
federal credits.
Rather than requiring the consumer to obtain a loan from a
financial institution to pay the unsubsidized portion, this change
created a leasing structure that has led to substantial increases in the
credit usage. This leasing structure proved to be lucrative for both
residential consumers and solar panel installers alike. After the tax
credit was extended to installers of solar panels, the credit amount
jumped from $1.4 million in the 2009 fiscal year to $7 million in the
2010 fiscal year.146 The initial installation and equipment costs are
completely financed by a leasing company.147 Then, solar panel
companies receive the Louisiana per system 50% credit and the
federal 30% grant,148 and the customer repays the remaining 20% in
installments to the leasing company.149 The leasing companies are
typically set up as separate entities of the solar panel installers but
are owned by the same individuals.150
Although the leasing company and the solar panel installers are
related entities, there are no regulations to govern the relationship.151
This lack of regulation creates problems when the installation entity
“sells” the equipment to the leasing company at an increased cost,
who then leases it out to the customers.152 The statute allows a tax
credit “per system” although “system” is not defined in the
statute.153 The related entities can take advantage of this by marking
up their product when it is sold to the leasing agent, and claim an
arbitrary number of systems in order to cover their installation and
production costs. For example, a panel that has a production cost of
$20,000 can be marked up to $50,000 when sold to the leasing
entity. The leasing entity can then file for two systems under the
wind and solar energy tax credits. The credit provides a 50% credit
of costs up to $25,000 per system, so the leasing entity is recovering
$25,000 when its initial costs were only $20,000. While this may
seem like fraudulent behavior from the solar panel installer and the
146. LA. DEP’T OF REVENUE, supra note 3, at 33.
147. Interview with Brandon Lagarde, CPA, Director, Postlethwaite &
Netterville, in Baton Rouge, La. (Oct. 8, 2012).
148. 26 U.S.C.A. § 25(D) (2013).
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. LA. ADMIN. CODE, tit. 61, pt. 1, § 1907 (2013).
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leasing company, it is technically allowed under the current
legislation because “system” is not defined.
C. The Effectiveness of Wind and Solar Energies
1. Wind
The wind energy industry is in a difficult stage because it is
competing directly with other developing types of energy
harvesting. Hydraulic fracturing has lessened the appeal of wind
energy: it has led to an abundant source of relatively cleaner energy
than petroleum and is less expensive than wind energy. While $2.93
MWh to $3.52 MWh has been the price of natural gas in past
years,154 natural gas has traded at $1.09 MWh.155 In comparison, the
unsubsidized cost of wind energy is $60 to $90 per MWh.156 If the
federal subsidies are included in the calculation along with
allowable tax depreciation, the cost of wind energy becomes $33 to
$65 per MWh.157 The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
expects costs to decrease 10–30% between 2015 and 2020 from
increased technology and economies of scale.158
2. Solar
The solar industry directly competes with retail utility
companies that supply energy to residential users. When utility
customers supplement or replace their utility energy usage with solar
power, these utilities lose business. To properly examine the
usefulness of solar energy, it must be compared to utility prices.
Residential solar panels cost $213 to $345 per MWh hour, and
154. Juliano, supra note 47. The original value calculated in MMBtu was
translated to MWh using a conversion calculator, which can be found at
http://www.convert-measurement-units.com/conversion-calculator.php?type=energy
(last visited Oct. 3, 2013).
155. Natural Gas, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., http://www.eia.gov/naturalgas
/weekly/ (last visited Oct. 6, 2013). The original value (Chicago Spot Prices)
calculated in MMBtu was translated to MWh using a conversion calculator, which
can be found at http://www.convert-measurement-units.com/conversion-calculator
.php?type=energy (last visited Oct. 3, 2013).
156. RYAN WISER ET AL., RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LEVELIZED COST OF
ENERGY FROM U.S. WIND POWER PROJECTS 36 (2012), http://eetd.lbl.gov/sites/all
/files/publications/wind-energy-costs-2-2012.pdf.
157. Id.
158. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL FOR CLIMATE CHANGE, IPCC SPECIAL
REPORT ON RENEWABLE ENERGY SOURCES & CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION 101,
at 11 (Ottmar Edenhofer et al., eds., 2011), http://www.uncclearn.org/sites/www
.uncclearn.org/files/inventory/ipcc15.pdf.

2013]

COMMENT

137

commercial panels can cost as little as $178 per MWh hour.159
Meanwhile, the average electricity cost for Louisiana in May 2012
was $85.70 per MWh hour for residential customers and $77.40 per
MWh hour for commercial customers.160
V. PROPOSALS AND SOLUTIONS
A. Federal Scope
As discussed above,161 the costs of solar and wind energy are not
competitive with non-renewable alternatives. If the overarching goal
of the federal incentives for renewable energy is to encourage clean
energy production, the policies should be created with both
sustainability and control of negative externalities as benchmarks. A
plan that makes renewable energy sources more competitive while
remaining fiscally responsible should include the abandonment of
existing non-renewable incentives, increased federal standards for
utilities, and a commitment to publicly funded research.
Also discussed above, tax policy is useful for addressing the
problem of externalities and encouraging certain activities.162
Unfortunately, the efforts of lobbyists and inconsistencies in drafting
tax legislation tend to distort the benefits of tax policy.163 For this
reason, it is best to abandon tax incentives in the energy sector
entirely and take a competitive market approach in conjunction with
federal standards. Since it is highly unlikely that legislators would
ever abandon tax policy in the energy market as a whole, legislators
should instead focus on winding down incentives for non-renewable
resources. Incentives for the petroleum industry further exacerbate
the deadweight loss created from the social costs of burning fossil
fuels. The market price of petroleum is not fully representative of
the cost of the activity, and petroleum companies are also rewarded
through tax incentives. Often, these incentives are pieced together in
an inconsistent, quilt-like fashion. For example, Louisiana offers
severance tax exemptions for drilling existing, deep wells and

159. ALEX THEMBATH & JESSE JENKINS, BREAKTHROUGH INSTITUTE, GAS
BOOM POSES CHALLENGES FOR RENEWABLES & NUCLEAR 7 (2012),
http://thebreakthrough.org/blog/Gas_Boom_Challenges_Renewables_Nuclear.pdf.
160. Louisiana State Profile and Energy Estimates, U.S. ENERGY INFO.
ADMIN.,http://www.eia.gov/state/state-energy-profiles-data.cfm?sid=LA#Prices
(last visited Oct. 4, 2013).
161. See supra Part IV.C.
162. See supra Part II.A.
163. See Brian Richter, et al., Lobbying and Taxes, 53 AM. J. POL. SCI. 893
(2009).
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rejuvenating old wells.164 At the same time, suspension of tax
liability is allowed on newly drilled wells until the estimated payout
is met.165 One can see that the purpose behind the exemptions is to
discourage unnecessary drilling and avoid waste, but the suspension
of tax liability works against the purpose by incentivizing new
drilling.
Along with the ideal goal of eliminating subsidies in the energy
industry, the federal government should develop standards to
increase the use of clean energy sources. The Clean Energy
Standard Act of 2012 (CES) drafted by New Mexico Senator Jeff
Bingaman proposed a market-based set of standards that govern the
activities of major utilities.166 The CES would begin regulating the
largest utilities in 2015 by requiring 24% of electric energy sold to
consumers to come from clean sources.167 The requirement can be
met by acquiring clean energy certificates through self-production or
through the certificate trading market compliance payments of $0.03
per kilowatt hour, or a combination of compliance payments and
certificates.168 The CES is a combination of renewable portfolio
standards and feed-in tariffs because the policy has components that
control both the quantity and the price of clean energy.169 The major
distinction between the CES and renewable energy portfolio
standards is that the CES allows the quota to be supplied by “clean
energy sources,” rather than only “renewable energy sources.” Clean
energy is defined as renewable energy, qualified renewable biomass,
natural gas, hydropower, nuclear power, or qualified waste-toenergy.170 Therefore, utilities can choose the most competitively
priced source of clean energy.171
One major reason for providing incentives to renewable energy
sources is that increasing the use of the energy technology will cause
it to be more efficient and cost-effective over time through
164. Mark J. Kaiser & Yunke Yu, A Severance Tax Revenue Forecast Model
for Louisiana, 21 NAT. RESOURCES RES. 245, 253 (2012).
165. Id.
166. Clean Energy Standard Act of 2012, S. 2146, 112th Cong. (2012),
available at http://www.energy.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2012/5/s-2146-theclean-energy-standard-act-of-2012.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. See Mary Jean Bürer & Rolf Wustenhagen, Which Renewable Energy
Policy is a Venture Capitalist’s Best Friend? Empirical Evidence From a Survey
of International Cleantech Investors, 37 ENERGY POL’Y 4997, 4999 (2009).
170. S. 2146.
171. However, competitive market systems do negate the benefits of feed-in
tariff policies (price stability and consumer confidence) because long-term pricing
contracts are not made between the energy producer and the utility. See infra Part
III.A.2.
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economies of scale. For example, wind turbine costs have been
found to decrease by 14% every time the total number in operation
doubles.172 The technology involved in developing renewable
sources would not advance at the same rate if incentives were
abandoned. An effective way to encourage more efficient means of
harvesting energy sources is to commit to publicly-funded research.
The Advanced Research Projects Agency-Energy (ARPA-E) was
started in 2007 to research and develop high-risk, high-reward
technology to increase energy efficiency and lower U.S. dependence
on imported energy.173 The SunShot Initiative shares the same
purpose as the ARPA-E, but focuses on reducing the cost of solar
energy production.174 The SunShot Initiative provides loans and
grants to private companies, laboratories, and academic institutions
that promise research into solar energy storage and production.175 It
is important to have a combination of purely governmental research
work and private research that is publicly funded. Purely
governmental research should fund projects that private groups are
not willing to pursue because of a low chance of a payoff. At the
same time, private researchers could focus on refining and
redesigning the way energy sources are utilized. These programs
could receive funding from revenue generated by ending tax
subsidies to the energy industries.
B. State Level
1. Proposed Amendments to the Wind and Solar Energy Systems
Credit
The Louisiana Department of Revenue has responded to the
inflated costs of the tax credit and has proposed an amendment to
WSES that limits the credit to one per residence or apartment
instead of one credit per wind or solar energy system.176 The
proposal also eliminates many of the system installation costs that

172. Press Release from Bloomberg New Energy Finance, Onshore Wind
Energy to Reach Parity with Fossil-Fuel Electricity by 2016 (Nov. 10, 2011),
available at http://bnef.com/PressReleases/view/172.
173. ARPA-E, Fiscal Year 2013 Congressional Justification (2013) at 401,
http://arpa-e.energy.gov/sites/default/files/ARPA-E%20FY13%20Budget%20
Request.pdf.
174. SunShot Initiative: About, DEP’T. OF ENERGY, https://www1.eere.energy
.gov/solar/sunshot/about.html (last visited Oct. 4, 2013).
175. Id.
176. LA. ADMIN. CODE, tit. 61, pt. I., §1907 (2013). Previously, the credit
could be applied to multiple systems used in one residence or apartment.
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can currently be credited.177 The Department of Revenue estimates
that if the amendment had been in place for the 2011 to 2012 fiscal
year, the credits that qualified for the WSES would have been cut by
40%.178 The estimated budget impact from the restrictions on the
WSES is about $62.7 million in savings over the next three years.179
However, the legislative intent behind the credit remains the same.
A comment to the proposed amendment indicates that the effects of
the amendment will be measured and monitored as a safeguard to
decreases in solar energy usage.180
2. Proposals
Tailoring the language of the WSES tax credit to increase solar
and wind energy production could reduce the large amount of tax
revenue lost per year. First, the statute should define the term
“system.” Under the current statute, “each residence or apartment
project in the state is eligible for tax credits for the number of
separate complete . . . systems necessary to ensure that the residence
is supplied with all of its energy needs.”181 As previously discussed,
the vague wording of “system” allows claimants to obtain an
unlimited number of systems credits and therefore recover 50% of
all solar installation costs.182 The proposed amendment states that
“regardless of the number of system components installed on each
qualifying residence or residential apartment complex, such
components shall constitute a single system for each residence or
dwelling unit in a residential rental apartment complex for purposes
of the tax credit.”183 The change clearly reflects the Legislature’s
intent to limit lost income from this loophole going forward, but the
limitation seems to stray from the purpose of providing residences
with affordable solar and wind energy. For example, an apartment
complex would clearly need a larger solar panel capacity than a
small single family home. Legislators should define “system” in
terms of usage, such as square footage or occupancy rather than
limiting the credit to one system per residence. This way the credit is
177. Id. (“Including certain capitalized expenditures, solar pool heating, certain
housing surrounding non-rooftop systems, labor costs including but not limited to
tree trimming or removal, cooling HVAC systems, certain attic fans or ventilation
systems, solar powered lights, air-conditioning/heating units, day lighting
apparatuses, pool pumps and all other stand-alone wind or solar devices.”).
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Supra Part IV.A.
183. LA. ADMIN. CODE, tit. 61, pt. I., §1907.
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equitable with energy consumption levels and would indicate true
costs of equipment.
Second, the credit should be based on a measurement of
production. Louisiana is one of two states that provides a 50% tax
credit for wind and solar energy systems. Oregon, the other state that
does so, allows a $2.10 credit per watt of the installed capacity.184 A
per-watt credit would reward the installation of high capacity
systems. Tying the credit to a wattage standard would also curb any
possibility of leasing companies installing lower capacity, lower cost
systems and applying for the tax credit after the price has been
marked up between the related parties. A kilowatt hour maximum
could serve as an alternative to the tax credit limit and reduce the
installation of unnecessary equipment that exceeds the amount of
possible energy usage.
Third, the credit should not apply solely to residential buildings.
If the purpose of the WSES credit is to increase the use of renewable
energy sources and reduce non-renewable sources, it is counterintuitive to disallow the tax credit for commercial buildings.
Commercial buildings are typically larger than residential structures
and would have more square footage of available roof space to
install large solar panel arrays. If the reason for only offering the
subsidy to consumer buildings is to limit lost tax revenue, the
previous recommendations would reduce the costs enough to keep
lost revenue at the same level or less.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, wind and solar energies are not yet sustainable on
their own merits when viewed next to alternatives. With recent
developments in hydraulic fracturing, natural gas is abundant and is
a cleaner alternative to traditional energy sources,185 though it is still
non-renewable. It would be most beneficial to end tax subsidies on
non-renewable energy sources and focus predominately on cleaner
and less expensive non-renewable alternatives until renewable
sources are capable of competing in a free market setting. This can
be accomplished by mandating renewable energy use through
increased federal standards and government-funded research at the
private and public levels.
184. OR. DEP’T. OF ENERGY, RESIDENTIAL ENERGY TAX CREDIT (RETC) RULES
16 (2011), http://www.oregon.gov/energy/CONS/RES/tax/docs/oar-retc.pdf.
185. Electricity from Natural Gas, ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, http://www
.epa.gov/cleanenergy/energy-and-you/affect/natural-gas.html (last updated Sept. 25,
2013) (“Compared to the average air emissions from coal-fired generation, natural
gas produces half as much carbon dioxide, less than a third as much nitrogen oxides,
and one percent as much sulfur oxides at the power plant.”).
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The recent Louisiana state budget crisis created in part by the
WSES and CVAF subsidies indicates that the absence of specificity
when drafting statutes leads to expensive and unforeseen results.
When considering the WSES tax credit, the state must first decide
whether cutting current costs are worth the decrease in renewable
energy use, jobs, and disposable income from consumers. Second,
the drafters must create enforcement mechanisms to dissuade abuses
of the tax credit. A per-energy unit standard for the solar panels or a
defined measurement of what a system is would be beneficial to
consumers who want to legitimately maximize their solar panel
usage, but they cannot due to the proposed one tax credit per system
cap. Third, and most importantly, Louisiana should examine what
their primary purpose behind enacting the WSES and then extend it
in situations that fit the purpose such as commercial buildings.
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